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INTRODUCTION 
While LWP is correct that the I iqi lidatoi seeks to recoup all payments 
made to LWP as an affiliate under the Utah Insurance Code § 31A-27-322 
(hereafter the "Statute"), it incorrectly argues that the Liquidator somehow 
conceded no wrongdoing by not pleading that the payments to LWP were other 
than fair compensatiot i Quite simpl> , the applicable statute does not require 
that the Liquidator plead such allegations and they therefore were intentioilally 
not pled. 
In addition to factual inaccuracies, LWP raises new arguments in its 
opposing brief tl lat must be addressed, First, LWP incorrectly argues that "the 
Liquidator did not plead or ,ttlempl to pro\e liiut I.W' - -. i mate that 
controlled Insurance or Mutual." The Statute does not require factual evidence 
of actual control. The Liquidator did in fact present evidence of common 
management and the ability to control-which qualifies as one of the three ways 
to demonstrate affiliate shit us, Regardless, 1 ""vYi" concedes that it was an affiliate 
and the Trial Court acknowledges LWP's explicit admission in its ()idei, 111. 
2437). 
Second, LWP and the Trial Court misinterpret the statutory requirement 
of control Court required proof of actual control. This is in direct 
contravention t :;.. Statute's ilHiiiifioiul sec (mil \s set forth hv T ty I " the 
definitional section, § 31A-1-301(5), delineates three types of affiliates: one that 
controls, one that is controlled, and one that is under common control and 
management. The error in LWP's argument is that it then goes on to argue that 
§ 31A-27-322 limits its application to only one of the three types of affiliates— 
one that controls. This interpretation would make § 31 A-1-301 surplusage, 
meaningless and in direct opposition to the principles of statutory interpretation. 
Further, this interpretation completely ignores and disregards the plain language 
of the definitional section of the Statute. Rather, given the choice of three 
different types of affiliates to choose from, the Liquidator seeks to recoup 
payments based on the common/overlapping management option. 
Finally, LWP advances an incorrect statutory interpretation of 
"distributions." Relying on the Statute's use of "dividend" in section 5, LWP 
argues that "distribution" and "dividend" are interchangeable. This 
interpretation is wrong. Rather, section 5 further clarifies section 4 and each 
section deals with a separate but related situation. 
Section 4 deals with joint and several liability for any distribution issued 
to any person, shareholder or not. Section 5 then further clarifies section 4 
explaining, that where a dividend (payments only to shareholders) is given out 
under section 4, and the person that received the dividend (i.e., a distribution in 
the form of a dividend) is insolvent, the dividend is still recoverable and joint 
2 
and several liability applies for any deficiency. The use of "distribution" and 
"dividend" in these two sections clearly demonstrate that "distribution" is being 
used as the broad category, with "dividend" as a sub-set of distribution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. COMMON OWNERSHIP OR OPERATION IS SUFFICIENT FOR 
THE COURT TO PRESUME CONTROL. 
Violating the basic principles of statutory construction, LWP argues that 
the Court should ignore the definitions of § 31 A-1-3 01 that apply to § 31 A-27-
322 and instead limit their application. The controlling Statute, UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 31 A-27-322 states in pertinent part as follows: 
If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or 
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in 
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver 
appointed under the order has a right to recover on 
behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled 
the insurer the amount of distributions, other than 
stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, 
made at any time during the five years preceding the 
petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. 
This recovery is subject to the limitations of 
Subsections (2) through (6). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-27-322. As agreed to by LWP, the definitional section 
of the Utah Insurance Code "delineates three types of affiliates," specifically: 
any person who controls, is controlled by, or is under 
common control with, another person. A corporation 
is an affiliate of another corporation, regardless of 
ownership, if substantially the same group of natural 
persons manages the corporation. 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-1-301(5); Mem. Opp. at 12. The Statute goes onto 
define "control," "controlled," and "under common control" as "the direct or 
indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the 
management and policies of a person. This control may be . . . by common 
management." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-1 -301 (27)(a) and (a)(ii). 
The error in LWP's argument is that it argues that only one of the above 
three types of affiliates is included in § 31A-27-322. Mem. Opp. at 12. This 
interpretation runs counter to the basic principles of statutory construction. In 
the present case, the three statutory types of affiliates are alternatives stated in 
the disjunctive (i.e., "or"). Thereby, it is necessary to prove that only one of the 
provisions is applicable. See, e.g., Hebertson v. Bank One, 1999 UT App 342, f 
10, 995 P.2d 7 (because the statute utilizes a disjunctive, by its plain language 
the plaintiff need only satisfy one of the conditions set forth by the statute). 
That does not mean, however, that only one of the three types of affiliates apply 
to § 31A-27-322, as LWP argues. To the contrary, because there are three 
separate types of affiliates, all three are applicable and the Liquidator need only 
prove that one of the three applies. LWP's construction would impermissibly 
render two of the three types of affiliates completely inoperable and mere 
surplusage. See Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286, 
1288 (Utah 1978) (statute should be read so as to avoid making any provisions 
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"surplusage and meaningless"); Ferro v. Utah Dep Y of Commerce, 828 P.2d 
507, 513 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (rejecting interpretation that would "rewrite the 
Act and impermissibly render the reciprocity provision a complete nullity"). 
Observing the plain language of the Statute and giving effect to each term 
demonstrates that LWP, along with the Trial Court, misinterpreted the plain 
language of the Statute, finding that "mere common ownership or operation,... 
is [not] a sufficient basis to presume control." (R. 2437). 
A. The Liquidator Presented Evidence of Common Management 
and Control. 
LWP further misstates that the Liquidator failed to present evidence of 
control Mem. Opp. at 14. While the Liquidator is statutorily permitted to 
recover from any affiliate any distribution made at any time during the five 
years preceding the petition for liquidation, it was not necessary for the 
Liquidator to prove or present evidence of actual control; rather it was sufficient 
to show common ownership or overlapping management to establish affiliate 
status. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-l-301(5) & (27)(a). LWP is an affiliate of 
Insurance because there was such common management. 
As presented in detail in the Brief of Appellants, the Liquidator presented 
evidence of overlapping management by the overlapping leadership positions of 
John Igoe and others in LWP and Insurance, the involvement of Mr. Igoe and 
other management persons in transactions between LWP and Insurance, the 
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decisions made by the overlapping management team regarding the claims 
handling services, the common employees, and the corporate 
relationship/ownership of the companies. See Brief at 24-27; (R. 2437, 1944, 
2255, 2298-9, 2296, 2300, 2284-2287, 2973, 3393 at 26 and 2399). 
The above evidence was submitted to the Trial Court in the Form B 
filings, Mr. Colby's affidavit, LWP's own admissions in John Igoe's affidavit 
and LWP's Motion for Summary Judgment, and confirm that Mr. Igoe and 
others operated Group, Insurance, and LWP with one common management, 
utilized the same employees, and entered into agreements with each other on 
behalf of one another. (R. 2288). While there is "no presumption that an 
individual holding an official position with another person controls that person 
solely by reason of the position," UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-l-301(27)(b), added 
to the other above-mentioned instances of common/overlapping management, it 
is indicative of common control. 
LWP's argument that the Liquidator was required to show a "complete 
identity of management" is also incorrect. Mem. Opp. at 16. The definitional 
section of the Statute requires common management, not "complete identity of 
management." UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-l-301(5) & (27)(a). 
LWP itself "freely acknowledged that it was an affiliate of Insurance for a 
period of time based on common ownership. It further admitted that there was 
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some overlap in management." Mem. Opp. at 15. The Trial Court also found 
"[tjhere is no question that LWP was an affiliate o f Insurance. (R. 2437). 
LWP and the Trial Court, however, incorrectly wanted proof that "one 
subsidiary controlled or was able to direct distributions by another subsidiary of 
a common parent." Mem. Opp. at 15; (R. 2977). The plain language of the 
Statute does not require this. Rather, choosing one of the three types of affiliates 
available, the Liquidator proved that it was under common control. (R. 2437, 
1944, 2255, 2298-9, 2296, 2300, 2284-2287, 2973, 3393 at 26 and 2399; see 
also, Brief at 24-27). The Liquidator was then only required to demonstrate, as 
it did, the "indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of 
management and policies" and not actual control. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-l-
301(27)(a). For this reason, the Trial Court's interpretation was directly 
contrary to the Statute. 
B. There Were Disputed Material Issues of Fact Regarding the 
Extent of LWP's Control of Insurance and Mutual. 
Completely disregarding the material issues of fact in dispute regarding 
the level and duration of control/management of Insurance, LWP incorrectly 
asserts that there were no disputed material facts with respect to Mutual. Mem. 
Opp. at 16. This argument is illogical given LWP's statement that "[a]s for 
Mutual, it is true that the Liquidator and LWP disagree about whether LWP was 
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an affiliate of Mutual." Mem. Opp. at 16. Affiliate status is the very basis of 
the present suit. 
LWP's statement that "the Liquidator has never alleged that LWP 
controlled Mutual" is contrary to the evidence presented in the affidavit of Mr. 
Colby. While LWP correctly states that Mr. Colby testified that Insurance and 
Mutual "were managed and controlled by substantially the same group of 
persons/' it incorrectly represents this was the only statement of Mr. Colby. (R. 
2300). Rather, Mr. Colby, in his position as Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer of Mutual from 1999 to July of 2003, testified that by nature 
of the corporate relationship of Group, Insurance, LWP and Mutual, there was 
affiliate status. (R. 2299 at f 11). Mr. Colby states that Mutual shared 
employees with Group and Insurance, had common management with LWP and 
Insurance which included John Igoe, Dennis Larson, Judy Adlam and others. 
(R. 2297-2300). The overlapping management team-such as John Igoe-was 
involved in drafting and/or administering services agreement with Mutual and 
Insurance, and supervised the day-to-day business activities and records for 
Mutual. (R. 2297-2301). Mr. Colby then directly testified that Mutual had 
affiliate status. (R. 2300 at 116). 
These allegations directly support the Liquidator's allegation of affiliate 
status. A material issue of fact was then created with the affidavits submitted by 
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LWP wherein Mr. Igoe disclaims affiliate status and specifically disputes Mr. 
Colby's testimony. (R. 1940, 2037, 2296-2302; 2396-2403). Given the material 
disputed issues of fact regarding Mutual and Insurance, summary judgment was 
improper. See, e.g., Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988) ("One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute 
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, 
precluding the entry of summary judgment."); Hill v. Grand Central, Inc., All 
P.2d 150, 151 (Utah 1970) (explaining summary judgment is not proper when 
there are genuine issues of material fact). It is for that reason that the Liquidator 
withdrew its motion for summary judgment with respect to Mutual. 
II. "DISTRIBUTION" AND "DIVIDEND" ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS. 
LWP's argument that "distribution" is used synonymously with 
"dividend" because of the use of "dividend" under section 4 of the Statute is 
unsustainable. Mem. Opp. at 20. Review of section 1 and both sections 4 and 5 
is necessary to obtain the full meaning of each and to understand that sections 4 
and 5 are consistent with one another-section 5 is merely a further amplification 
of section 4. 
Sections 1, 4 and 5 of § 31A-27-322 state: 
(1) If an order for the liquidation, rehabilitation, or 
conservation of an insurer authorized to do business in 
this state is ordered under this chapter, the receiver 
appointed under the order has a right to recover on 
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behalf of the insurer from any affiliate that controlled 
the insurer the amount of distributions, other than 
stock dividends paid by the insurer on its capital stock, 
made at any time during the five years preceding the 
petition for liquidation, rehabilitation, or conservation. 
This recovery is subject to the limitations of 
Subsections (2) through (6). 
(4) Any person who was an affiliate that controlled 
the insurer at the time the distributions were paid is 
liable up to the amount of distributions he received. 
Any person who was an affiliate that controlled the 
insurer at the time the distributions were declared is 
liable up to the amount of distributions he would have 
received if they had been paid immediately. If two or 
more persons are liable regarding the same 
distributions, they are jointly and severally liable. 
(5) If any person liable under Subsection (4) is 
insolvent, all affiliates that controlled that person at the 
time the dividend was declared or paid are jointly and 
severally liable for any resulting deficiency in the 
amount recovered from the insolvent affiliate. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 31 A-27-322(l), (4) & (5). 
As demonstrated by the plain language, section 4 is discussing joint and 
several liability, specifically, where a distribution was paid, any person that 
received the distribution is jointly and severally liable. Because a distribution 
can be issued to shareholders and/or non-shareholders, this section seeks to 
recoup any and all distributions, whether shareholder or not. Section 5 then 
further clarifies section 4, explaining that where a dividend (payments only to 
shareholders) is given out under section 4, and the person that received the 
dividend (i.e., a distribution in the form of a dividend) is insolvent, the dividend 
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is still recoverable and joint and several liability applies for any deficiency. The 
"distribution" and "dividend" in sections 4 and 5 are not used synonymously as 
LWP argues, but are dealing with two separate but related situations. The 
Statute uses "distribution" as the broad category of what can be recovered, and 
"dividend" as a sub-set thereof. 
This interpretation is further consistent with the legislative history. The 
author of the current Utah Insurance Code, Professor Spencer L. Kimball, was 
concerned with all "intergroup transactions" and his comments evidence that the 
Statute was intended to address all potential abuses with affiliates, not just 
dividends. (R. 2278-9, 2333). 
LWP also incorrectly argues that the "Liquidator points to no authority for 
his position on the meaning of the word 'distribution' beyond a district court 
case with no precedential value . . . . " and that the Trial Court abided by the 
rules of statutory construction. Mem. Opp. at 19. 
The Liquidator bases its interpretation on the plain meaning of the words 
of the Statute, and verified the plain meaning of the words by looking at the 
legislative intent and purpose of the Statute, as required by Utah law. Water & 
Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^ f 18,48 P.3d 888, 894 
(Utah 2000); In re Gonzales, 2000 UT 28,123, 1 P.3d 1074, 1079. It also 
provided the American Western Life Ins. Company in Liquidation v. LelandA. 
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Wolf 'case where another judge dealt with the exact issue here. (R. 2342-2358). 
While this case is not controlling, it is certainly instructive. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Adhere To the Rules of Statutory 
Construction. 
The Trial Court did not adhere to the rules of statutory construction. LWP 
itself explains that the "trial court looked to the plain meaning of 'distribution' 
as defined in other sections of the Utah Code . . . . " Mem. Opp. at 19. 
Reviewing the ruling of the Trial Court also evidences that the Trial Court went 
beyond the plain meaning of the Statute. (R. 2438, 2974-2980). As explained 
by the Utah Supreme Court: "When interpreting a legislative enactment, 'we 
look first to the plain language of the act to determine its meaning.'" Keil, 2002 
UT 32,1fl8, 48 P.3d 888, 894 (internal citation omitted). The Trial Court did 
not first look to the plain language of the Statute to determine the meaning of 
"distribution" and "dividend" but rather, looked to "other sections of the Utah 
Code." Mem. Opp. at 19; R. 2433, 2974-2980). If the Trial Court found the 
terms ambiguous, it should have looked to the "reason, spirit, and sense of the 
legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute 
dealing with the subject.'" In re Gonzales, 2000 UT 28, f 23, 1 P.3d at 1079. 
Accordingly, rather than solely looking to other definitions of "distribution" and 
"dividend" within the Utah Code, the Trial Court should have deferred to the 
legislative history. 
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Regardless, the other code sections cited by LWP either actually support 
the Liquidator's interpretation of distribution as the broad category and dividend 
as a subset or sub-class of distribution or are completely irrelevant to the present 
analysis. LWP cites § 16-10a-102(13), incorrectly stating that it demonstrates 
that "distribution is not any transfer of money or property but rather denotes 
dividing up and passing out of equity." Mem. Opp. at 20. The plain language of 
§ 16-10a-102(13) states that a distribution "means a direct or indirect transfer of 
money or other property" and includes many items, such as dividends, 
acquisitions of shares or any other forms. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-102(13) 
(emphasis added). The plain language of this statute shows that while a 
dividend is a sub-class of distribution, the reverse is not true, a distribution is not 
a sub-set of dividend. It also clearly provides that distributions can be more than 
distributions of equity and specifically include money, property or any other 
forms. 
Similarly, § 31A-5-418, also cited by LWP, explicitly provides that a 
dividend is a sub-set of distribution. It states that the broad category of 
distributions can be effectuated but that the sub-set dividend cannot be paid 
unless certain circumstances are satisfied. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31 A-5-418. 
Sections 31A-16-105(2)(c)(vii) and 31A-16-106(2)(b) use distribution and 
dividend in the same way-a dividend is a sub-set of distribution. 
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Finally, LWP's argument that use of the word "transfers" in § 31A-27-
320 and "preference" in § 31A-27-321 "strongly supports the conclusion that 
Section 322 was only intended to reach distributions of equity of an insurer" 
requires a giant constructional leap. Mem. Opp. at 21. Both those sections are 
dealing with different situations (i.e., fraudulent transfers and voidable 
preferences), and evidence nothing other than the legislature's use of different 
concepts and methods of recovering assets. To somehow equate "preference" 
and "transfers" as used in other sections with "distribution" is a non-sequitur. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court, misinterpreting § 31A-27-322 of the Utah Code, 
incorrectly granted summary judgment to LWP. Wasatch Crest respectfully 
asks the Utah Supreme Court to reverse the Trial Court's granting of summary 
judgment in LWP's favor and find as follows: (1) consistent with the evidence 
presented to the Trial Court, Wasatch Crest asks that this Court find that LWP 
was an affiliate of Insurance and thereby in control of Insurance; (2) as an 
affiliate of Insurance, Insurance is entitled to recoupment of any distribution 
which includes monies paid for services rendered; (3) the only distributions 
Insurance is not entitled to are dividends that are shown to be fair and 
reasonable; and (4) that there were material issues of fact that precluded 
summary judgment as to Mutual. 
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DATED this 21st day of August, 2006. 
HOLLAND & HART LLP 
John P. Harrington 
Cecilia M. Romero 
Attorneys for the Liquidator 
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